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Abstract 
South Africa has the status of being the richest country based on mineral reserves. This status 
incentivised many offshore investors to invest in shares in South African mining companies which, 
in turn, hold mining rights and/or prospecting rights. This research evaluates, with specific 
reference to offshore investors, whether any South African capital gains tax implications would 
arise upon the disposal by non-residents of shares in a South African company holding prospecting 
rights or mining rights. The report focuses on paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) as well as the legal nature of mining rights, prospecting rights and 
prospecting information to determine whether such rights and information would fall within the 
ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. The report concludes on whether the 
disposal by non-resident shareholders of shares in a South African company which holds mining 
rights and/or prospecting rights would fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act. 
Key words: mining rights, prospecting rights, immovable property, interest or right to or in 
immovable property, prospecting information, paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, 
capital gains tax. 
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1 Chapter outline 
1.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introductory chapter will introduce the background and significance of the research. The 
introduction will further set out the research problem, sub-problems, scope and limitations as 
well as the methodology utilised to conduct the research report. 
1.2 Chapter 2: The legal nature of the term ‘immovable property’ 
Chapter 2 will analyse the general meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ as this term is not 
defined in the Eighth Schedule to the Act, nor is it defined anywhere else in the Act. It is 
therefore important to obtain a firm understanding of the general context of the words in order 
to interpret same in the context of the Act. 
1.3 Chapter 3: The words ‘immovable property’ and ‘any interest or right of whatever 
nature to or in immovable property’ as contemplated in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act 
Chapter 3 will consider the meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ and the phrase ‘any right 
of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule 
to the Act. It is important to consider the context in which these words are used the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act in order to determine whether the general meaning of ‘immovable 
property’, as concluded in Chapter 2, could be ascribed to these words as provided in paragraph 
2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
1.4 Chapter 4: The nature of prospecting rights and mining rights 
Chapter 4 will explore the nature of prospecting rights and mining rights which is granted to an 
applicant in terms of the MPRDA. Consideration will be given as to how the South African 
Revenue Service (‘SARS’) classifies prospecting rights and mining rights as set out in the 
Capital Gains Tax Guide provided by SARS. 
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1.5 Chapter 5: The interpretation of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
Chapter 5 will analyse and interpret paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act in order to 
determine the meaning and purpose of the words set out in this paragraph following from the 
understanding obtained in the previous chapters of the various terms and phrases as well as the 
nature thereof.  
1.6 Chapter 6: Separation of prospecting rights and prospecting information as well as 
the nature of prospecting information 
Chapter 6 will establish whether a distinction can be drawn between a prospecting right and 
prospecting information obtained in the prospecting phase of a mining operation. The chapter 
will further consider the nature of the information gained from prospecting in order to determine 
whether such information would be regarded as ‘immovable property’ and therefore fall within 
the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
1.7 Chapter 7: 80% analysis 
Chapter 7 will explore how to conduct the 80% analysis as provided in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act. It will consider any guidance provided by SARS as well as the 
potential assistance provided from a double tax agreement. 
1.8 Chapter 8: Conclusion and recommendation 
Chapter 8 will conclude on the findings of the research and will further attempt to provide a 
recommendation as to additional aspects which could be considered to provide further clarity on 
the research conducted to formulate the opinion reached in Chapter 8. 
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2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
2.1 Context of the Study 
Based on various internet sources
1
, South Africa is the richest country based on mineral reserves 
with a mineral reserve value of US$2.5 thousand billion. South Africa is the world’s biggest 
producer of the mineral platinum and one of the leading producers of gold, diamonds and coal. 
Some of the top mining companies within South Africa include, inter alia, BHP Billiton, Anglo 
American and Impala Platinum. Ninety-five percent
2
 of South Africa’s market capital is also 
dominated by the thirteen top mining companies within South Africa. It can therefore be argued 
that South Africa is an attractive investment option for foreign companies, especially foreign 
mining companies looking to expand into Africa (with specific reference to South Africa).  
One of the brilliant minds and mathematicians in history, Albert Einstein, was quoted saying 
that ‘The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.’3 With reference to the 
filing of tax returns, Albert Einstein went on to say that ‘This is too difficult for a 
mathematician. It takes a philosopher.’4 Considering the South African tax legislation and the 
interplay between the tax legislation and other statutes, the opinions expressed by Albert 
Einstein would, in all probability, hold true when attempting to interpret such statutes. 
In South Africa, the Act governs tax on income. Minerals and the rights to such minerals have 
been governed by various forms of legislation which includes, inter alia, the Minerals Act 50 of 
1991. Nevertheless, for most of the past decade, the right to extract minerals has been governed 
by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (‘the MPRDA’). The 
MPRDA came into effect on 1 May 2004 and, in essence, provides that the State is the 
custodian of mineral resources. 
Upon consideration of the shareholding of active South African mining companies, all of which 
holds mining rights, prospecting rights or a combination of both, a vast amount of these 
                                                          
1
 Forget Oil: 15 Countries Sitting On A Fortune Of Metals And Minerals - Gus Lubin. Available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/15-resources-rich-countires-2010-4?op=1. [Accessed 28 March 2013]; 
The World’s Top 5 Mining Countries - Cori O’Donnell. Available at 
http://www.wealthwire.com/news/global/2372. [Accessed 28 March 2013].  
2 The World’s Top 5 Mining Countries - Cori O’Donnell. Available at 
http://www.wealthwire.com/news/global/2372. [Accessed 28 March 2013]. 
3
 Tax Quotes, Funny Tax Quotes That Unravel the Mystery of Income Tax - Simran Khurana. Available 
at http://quotations.about.com/od/moretypes/a/taxquotes1.htm. [Accessed 28 March 2013]. 
4
 Tax Quotes, Funny Tax Quotes That Unravel the Mystery of Income Tax - Simran Khurana. Available 
at http://quotations.about.com/od/moretypes/a/taxquotes1.htm. [Accessed 28 March 2013]. 
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companies are ultimately held by non-resident offshore shareholders who, in most cases, enter 
the South African market through favourable tax jurisdictions (i.e. Mauritius, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands etc.). The reason for these jurisdictions being considered as 
favourable, is due to the double tax agreements currently in force between South Africa and the 
respective jurisdictions which provide protection against, inter alia, capital gains tax upon the 
disposal of the shares in the South African companies where such shares are considered to be 
property rich for South African tax purposes. In general, non-resident will be subject to South 
African income tax or capital gains tax in the event of a disposal which is regarded as a disposal 
of ‘immovable property’ or ‘an interest or right to or in immovable property’ as contemplated in 
paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act.
5
 In order for a disposal to be regarded as a 
disposal of an ‘interest or right to or in immovable property’ two requirements need to be met. 
Firstly, there needs to be a disposal of at least 20% of the shareholding in a South African 
company and secondly, 80% or more of the market value of the shares disposed of must be 
directly or indirectly attributed to immovable property situated within South Africa.
6
 It is 
imperative that both these requirements are met before paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act can apply. A company is therefore referred to as being ‘property rich’ where both the 
aforementioned requirements are met.  
In light of the above and in the context of mining companies, the question that often arises is 
whether a company which holds a prospecting right, mining right or a combination of both 
would be considered to be ‘property rich’ and whether the disposal by a non-resident 
shareholder of its shares in such a company would fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
Before it can be concluded whether a disposal of shares by a non-resident shareholder in a South 
African company holding mining rights or prospecting rights would fall within the ambit of 
paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, certain additional questions need to be answered. 
The questions that need to be answered, to name but a few,  is what is the nature of mining 
rights and prospecting rights and what is the meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ in 
general as well as in the context of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
This study will therefore firstly consider the general legal meaning of the term ‘immovable 
property’ after which the term will be interpreted in the context of paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act. Once this has been established, a further analysis will be conducted on the 
                                                          
5
 As set out in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
6
 Paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
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legal nature of mining rights and prospecting rights to determine whether these rights would be 
regarded as ‘immovable property’ in the context of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Act. After consideration is given to the meaning of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Act and whether a distinction can be drawn between a prospecting right and prospecting 
information, a final conclusion will be drawn on whether a disposal of shares by a non-resident 
shareholder in a South African company holding mining rights or prospecting rights would fall 
within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
2.2 Problem statement 
2.2.1 Main problem 
Will mining rights and prospecting rights be regarded as ‘immovable property’ or ‘an interest or 
right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as contemplated in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act? 
2.2.2 Sub-problems 
The sub-problems identified, which need to be addressed in order to assist in attempting to 
provide an academic answer to the main research problem, are as follows: 
 What is the general meaning that can be ascribed to the term ‘immovable property’?  
 This question needs to be answered due to the term ‘immovable property’ not being 
defined in the Act. Consideration should therefore be given to the general meaning 
in order to ascribe such a meaning to the term as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act. 
 What is the meaning of the words ‘immovable property’ and the phrase ‘any interest or right 
of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act? 
 Once the general meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ has been established, 
the focus shifts to the interpretation of the words ‘immovable property’ and the 
phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ in the 
context of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act by virtue of ascribing the 
general meaning of the term to the aforementioned term and phrase. 
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 What is the legal nature of prospecting rights and mining rights granted in terms of the 
MPRDA? 
 In order to conclude on whether a prospecting right or mining right would be 
regarded as ‘immovable property’ or an ‘interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
immovable property’, the legal nature of a prospecting right or mining right would 
firstly need to be determined following which a conclusion can be drawn on 
whether it will fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Act. 
 What is the meaning of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act as a whole, more 
specifically, the meaning of paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act? 
 Paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act is specifically applicable to non-
residents as they will be subject to capital gains tax should they fall within the ambit 
of this paragraph. It therefore needs to be determined what the intention of this sub-
paragraph is and how this sub-paragraph seeks to pull non-residents into the capital 
gains tax net.  
 Can a distinction be drawn between a prospecting right and prospecting information and if 
so, what is the nature of such prospecting information?  
 Due to the fact that prospecting information is obtained through conducting 
prospecting activities by virtue of a prospecting right, it needs to be established 
whether the value of such prospecting information can be separated from the 
prospecting right. If this holds true, it further needs to be established whether such 
prospecting information would be regarded as ‘immovable property’ for purposes of 
paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
2.3 Delimitations of the study 
The research question will be limited to the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act. The term ‘immovable property’ is used in section 9(2)(j) and section 35A of the Act (to 
name but a few). Section 9(2)(j)specifically deals with a disposal on revenue account whilst 
section 35A provides for a withholding obligation upon the disposal by a non-resident of 
immovable property situated in South Africa respectively. The report will therefore not focus on 
the disposal on revenue account as envisaged in section 9(2)(j) and will be limited to a disposal 
of immovable property on capital account as that term is used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act. 
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2.4 Research methodology 
This research will be performed using a qualitative approach through conducting an extensive 
literature review. This review will explore the legal nature of prospecting rights and mining 
rights, the meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ and the phrase ‘interest or rights of 
whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as well as interpret the meaning of paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Act as a whole. The results of this review is intended to provide 
clarity on whether non-residents would be subject to South African capital gains tax upon the 
disposal of shares held in a South African company which holds prospecting rights and/or 
mining rights. 
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3 Chapter 2: The term ‘immovable property’ 
The Act does not provide a definition for the term ‘immovable property’. It therefore goes 
without saying that paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, which refers to the term 
‘immovable property’ on multiple occasions, also does not provide a definition for this term. 
Due to the fact that no definition is provided for the term ‘immovable property’ in the Act, it is 
necessary to ascertain the general meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ in order to 
understand the  context in which it is  used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act.  
3.1 Immovable property: The common law meaning 
When looked at from a legal perspective, the term ‘immovable property’ is used in order to 
draw a distinction between things based on their relation to man and/or according to their 
nature, in this case, the distinction between movable and immovable.
7
 It is provided in LAWSA 
(supra) that the ‘most important classification of things is the division between movables and 
immovables’.8  Although the distinction between movables and immovables was firstly made in 
Roman law, this distinction was of a subordinate interest at the time. It was, however, later 
taken over by the Roman Dutch law and thereafter confirmed in South African case law.
9
 The 
general accepted legal definition which has been attributed to the term ‘immovable property’ is 
land and everything which is attached to such land, either by way of natural or artificial means, 
and which cannot be removed from such land without causing damage to that land or without 
that land losing its identity.
10
   
There is little debate, and it is generally accepted, that land constitutes immovable property. 
Conversely, numerous views exist on whether that which affixes to immovable property has 
become immovable property or not. This aspect is, however, not of importance for the current 
analysis and has therefore not been considered further. What is important is whether things of 
an incorporeal nature would be regarded as immovable property. In layman’s terms, incorporeal 
things are things which lack physical substance and include, inter alia, rights, shares etc. This 
                                                          
7
 Joubert, W.A. (ed.), 2001. The Law of South Africa. Vol. 25(1). 2nd ed; sv “Things” by C G van der 
Merwe, paragraph 211; Badenhorst, P.J., Pienaar, J.M., Mostert, H., van Rooyen, M., 2003. Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s: The Law of Property. 5th ed; Grotius Inleidinge 2 1 4 Van der Keessel, D G, 1961-
1975. Praelectiones Iuris Hodiernie Grotii Introductionem ad Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam; Van 
Leeuwen RHR 2 1 1. 
8
 LAWSA (supra) paragraph 224. 
9
 LAWSA (supra) paragraph 224.   
10
 LAWSA (supra) paragraph 224, Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) page 40, paragraph 3.2.2.2 (a). 
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classification between corporeals and incorporeals was confirmed in Roman law where 
tangibles (i.e. land, clothing, gold etc.) were classified as corporeal things while intangibles (i.e. 
usufruct, contractual rights etc.) were classified as incorporeal.
11
 One of the first court cases in 
which this exact issue was considered was in Ex Parte Master of the Supreme Court.
12
 The facts 
of that case can be summarised as follows: 
 The City and Suburban Co. granted a stand for ninety-nine years to the applicant; 
 Matthews, for the applicant, argued that the stand is a lease in longum tempus (i.e. long 
time and long use), and that a lease in longum tempus is immovable property; 
 Dickson, for the Registrar of Deeds, was of the view that in the Roman law, only fundus 
praedium (i.e. real estate) was immovable, all other things were movables; 
 Innes C.J. was required to decide whether the deed granted for ninety-nine years would 
indeed be regarded as immovable property as referred to in the Administration of 
Estates Proclamation, 1902. 
Section 108 of the Administration of Estates Proclamation allowed the Master to occasionally 
invest money into the Guardian's Fund where such funds were to be invested on mortgage of 
immovable property. As the term was not defined in the Administration of Estates 
Proclamation, the court decided that the legislature’s intention must be followed in order to 
determine the meaning of the term ‘immovable property’. In this regard, it was assumed that the 
legislature used this term based on its ordinary legal meaning. In establishing the ordinary legal 
meaning, the court referred to writers such as van der Keessel, Voet and Mattheus. Van der 
Keessel was quoted to say: 
‘By the law of Holland, as under the Roman law, incorporeal things, where the law or 
the will of the owner has given no direction to the contrary, are not comprehended 
under movables or immovables, as in the case of legacies, agreements and mortgages.’ 
Voet, on the other hand, was quoted saying:  
‘Incorporeal things are things which can neither be handled nor touched, and consist in 
a right, as inheritances, servitudes, debts, actions, and revenues. But as the greatest 
portion of the municipal laws ignores the division into corporeal and incorporeal, and 
                                                          
11
 Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) page 33, paragraph 3.2.2.1. 
12
 1906 TS 563 at 565 – 566. 
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is content with a mere division into movables and immovables (Matthaeus, de 
Auctionibus, 1, 3,13, and de Criminibus, 48, 20, 4, 21), it will be worth while to inquire 
under which class each incorporeal thing is to be accounted, whether movable or 
immovable.’ 
Based on the above wording, the court came to the conclusion that Voet’s view is common 
sense and the preferred view and that, as a result, incorporeal rights can be divided into movable 
or immovable things where possible. The court further concluded that, based on Roman Dutch 
law, not only is this the general rule but it is also the intention of the legislature when it used the 
term ‘immovable property’ and that it was intended that the wider meaning of the term was to 
be used to include incorporeal rights.  
When considering the definition of the term ‘immovable property’ in different legislation, it is 
noticed that the exact same meaning is not always used throughout. The Administration of 
Estates Act
13
 defines immovable property as ‘land and every real right in land or minerals 
(other than any right under a bond) which is registrable in any office in the Republic used for 
the registration of title to land or the right to mine’. The Deeds Registries Act 14  defines 
immovable property as ‘any registered lease of land which, when entered into, was for a period 
of not less than ten years or for the natural life of the lessee or any other person mentioned in 
the lease, or which is renewable from time to time at the will of the lessee indefinitely or for 
periods which together with the first period amount in all to not less than ten years
15
, a 
registered right of leasehold
16
 and a registered right of initial ownership contemplated in 
section 62 of the Development Facilitation Act, 1995’.17 Although the meaning of the term 
‘immovable property’ as used in these statutes cannot provide a court with the meaning which 
should be ascribed to the term when interpreting paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, 
it can be used as a guideline as to what the legislature of the Act could have intended the 
meaning of ‘immovable property’ to be and could furthermore be used for persuasive purposes.  
Regardless of the aforementioned, when one refers back to publications on the law of property, 
a conclusion can be drawn that authors of such publications are all of the view that in order to 
determine whether a right is movable or immovable, one would need to establish the nature of 
                                                          
13
 No. 66 of 1965, section 1. 
14
 No. 47 of 1937, section 10. 
15
 Paragraph (b). 
16
 Paragraph (c). 
17
 Paragraph (d). 
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the object to which such a right relates.
18 
As a result, a further distinction should be made 
between real rights and personal rights. Based on the classical theory, a real right considers the 
relationship between a person and a thing while a personal right considers the relationship 
between two persons.
19
 On the other hand, the personalist theory states that a real right is a right 
to a thing and generally has corporeal property as its object. Such a real right is normally 
enforceable against all other persons. Conversely, a personal right is normally only enforceable 
against a certain person and has performance as its object.
20
 Due to the fact that the object of a 
personal right can never be a corporeal item, it can be said that a personal right can never 
constitute immovable property.  
With regard to real rights, a further distinction can be drawn between real rights which have 
immovable property as its object and real rights which have movable property as its object. The 
first mentioned will be regarded as immovable property whilst the latter will be regarded as 
movable property. The question that needs to be asked when considering this approach is 
whether it can be practically applied throughout the Act and on a consistent basis. From a 
general perspective and based on the discussion above, a long term lease is regarded as 
immovable property. When one refers back to the definition of immovable property in the 
Deeds Registries Act (supra) quoted above, it is clear that only a lease of land for a period of at 
least ten years would be regarded as immovable property. This would imply that regardless of 
the fact that one has a lease over property (i.e. the object of which is immovable) and to the 
extent that the lease period over such property is not for a period of at least ten years, such a 
lease (or right) would not be regarded as immovable property.  
3.2 Conclusion  
Based on the above a view can be reached that, in general, immovable property constitutes land. 
Incorporeal rights can be divided into movable or immovable things and in order to determine 
whether a right is movable or immovable, one would need to establish the nature of the object to 
which such a right relates. A personal right can never be a corporeal item and would therefore 
never be regarded as immovable property whilst a real right which has immovable property as 
its object will be regarded as immovable property. 
                                                          
18 
Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) page 35, paragraph 3.2.2.2 (b). Also see Voet 1 8 20 et seq; Van der 
Keessel (supra) at GR 2 1 14 and Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtgeleetheyt, 2 1 10.
 
19
 Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) page 47, paragraph 4.2; C G van der Merwe (supra), paragraph 234. 
20
 Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) page 48, paragraph 4.2; C G van der Merwe (supra), paragraph 232. 
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3.3 Immovable property: Mining rights and prospecting rights  
In light of the Deeds Registries Act (supra) and when referring to mineral rights, the court case 
of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Oceana Development Investment Trust Plc
21
 is 
one case in which a judgment regarding the nature of these rights was delivered. In this case, 
Goldstone J held that: 
‘...whatever difficulties might still remain about the precise juristic nature of mineral 
rights, and having regard to ss 70 - 74 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, there 
appeared to be no doubt that they constituted real rights, ius in re aliena; there was 
also no doubt that they were incorporeal rights relating to immovable property and had 
to be regarded as immovable incorporeals.’22 
The difficulty expressed by Goldstone J above with regards to the juristic nature of mineral 
rights is something which courts have been faced with since the early nineties. As early as 1903, 
Innes CJ in Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels, Oliver, and the Coronation Freehold Estates, 
Town, and Mines Ltd
23
 made a confession that he experienced a great deal of difficulty to be in a 
position to attribute a suitable juristic niche to the right to search for and remove minerals.
24
 
This exact question is one which has come under scrutiny by various academic writers; all 
expressing different views, and it was also subject to much judicial comment.
25
 In the 
abovementioned case, Innes CJ was reluctant to express an explicit view on the nature of such 
rights. He did, however, make the following comment: 
‘Rights of that nature are peculiar to the circumstances of the country, and do not 
readily fall under any of the classes of real rights discussed by the commentators. They 
seem at first sight to be very much of the nature of personal servitudes; but they are 
freely assignable.’26 
In van Vuren and Others v Registrar of Deeds
27
, Innes CJ did not have any additional comments 
to add, save for those mentioned in the Lazarus and Jackson case (supra). He did, however, 
refer to a transaction giving effect to the reservation of mineral rights which would constitute a 
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22
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24
 Franklin and Kaplan, Mining and Mineral Laws, page 8. 
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 Franklin and Kaplan (supra). 
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‘personal quasi-servitude’.28  This view expressed by Innes CJ has been adopted in a vast 
number of decisions. In Rocher v Registrar of Deeds
29
, the court held that: 
‘What exactly these rights ought to be called is a matter of some difficulty, but I think 
that the phrase which was used by Innes C.J., in van Vuren’s case is a convenient one – 
that is, that they are quasi-servitudes. They confer the right to go on the soil of another 
person and extract minerals for you own benefit.’ 
This view was also accepted by Bristow J in Coronation Collieries v Malan
30
 where he added: 
‘...and I think that it might be added that a so-called lease of mineral rights is really a 
grant of a quasi-servitude.’ 
Based on the above, and referring back to the Deeds of Registries (supra)
31
, a conclusion can be 
drawn that minerals rights are regarded as real rights (or iura in re aliena) with the nature of 
personal quasi-servitudes and are also registrable as such.
32
 Furthermore, in light of the 
discussion in 3.1 above, a mining right, from a common law perspective, would be regarded as 
immovable property. The reason being is that a mining right provides the holder the right to the 
underlying minerals situated on a property, which is therefore an incorporeal right to land and 
that which relates to such land. 
A prospecting right (i.e. a contract to prospect), on the other hand, does not provide the holder 
with a right to the underlying minerals. A prospecting right merely provides the holder the right 
to go onto someone’s property, and conduct prospecting activities, which includes excavations, 
sinking of boreholes and any other activities necessary to conduct the prospecting operations.
33
 
At no time does the holder of a prospecting right have a right to the minerals nor do they have a 
right to dispose of minerals obtained as part of the prospecting operations save for such 
quantities required to conduct tests on the minerals or to identify or analyse such minerals.
34
 The 
questions that need to be answered in this regard are whether: 
i. a prospecting right provides the holder with a right against the world (i.e. a real right); 
and 
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ii. such right provides the holder with a title to land to which such prospecting right relates 
to. 
In order to determine whether the above would indeed hold true, consideration is given to a 
prospecting contract. A prospecting contract consisted of two elements, firstly a right to 
prospect and secondly the option to acquire the land or the mineral rights. 
35
 It needs to be 
considered whether a prospecting contract, when registered, would create a real right which is 
enforceable against the world with regard to both elements of a prospecting contract. 
Referring to an earlier decision regarding the nature of an agreement which provides an option 
or a right of pre-emption, De Villiers CJ
36
 said: 
‘I cannot agree that in the view that an option is capable of formal transfer and 
registration in the Deeds Office. It is a personal contract, giving the purchaser of the 
option the right to purchase the farm for a certain price, and until the farm is purchased 
there is no real right which is capable of registration.’ 
The above judgment was followed in various other decisions.
37
 Regardless of the above, there 
are numerous court decisions which support the view that where there is a right which is a 
subtraction from the dominium and which also binds the successor of the grantor of such right, 
such a right would constitute a real right. Franklin and Kaplan (supra)
38
 agree with the above 
and submit that ‘the content of the right to prospect on property amounts to a diminution of or 
subtraction from the full dominium of the owner, and as such constitutes a real right’.39 This 
statement is based on the analysis by Franklin and Kaplan in Chapter I.
40
  
With specific reference to a contract which contains the right to prospect and win minerals 
(which he also regarded as a real right) and an option to purchase the mineral rights, Innes CJ in 
the Lazarus and Jackson case (supra)
41
 was of the view that: 
‘The option to purchase the mineral rights of the farm, on the other hand, is merely a 
personal right, and no amount of legislative direction as to its form can make it 
anything else.’ 
                                                          
35
 Franklin and Kaplan (supra), page 15. 
36
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37
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and other authorities cited therein. 
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A decision supporting the above and along similar lines, was in Hollins v Registrar of Deeds
42
. 
In this specific case, a farmer sold half of any mynpacht to which he was or might have been 
entitled to under the Gold Law. Innes CJ held that such a contract merely provided the 
purchaser with a personal right which was contingent upon the farm being proclaimed under the 
Gold Law and furthermore, that such a personal right could not be registered against the title 
deeds.
43
 In Cape Coast Exploration Ltd v Registrar of Deeds
44
, Centlivres AJ said 
‘…a contract which allows only prospecting…does not appear to be registrable.’ 
It can therefore be said that where a prospecting contract does not provide the option to lease or 
purchase the mineral right or land to which it relates, such a prospecting contract would not be 
regarded as a real right. This is supported in Vansa Vanadium SA Limited v Registrar of Deeds 
and Others
45
 where it was held that a prospecting contract registered in the Deeds Office did not 
create a real right. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the decision of Cullinan v 
Pistorius
46
, the views of Joubert 1959 THRHR 82 and other writers.
47
 The view expressed by 
these writers was that a prospecting contract which merely provides the prospector with the 
right to search for minerals was a personal right and not a real right. This court in the Vansa 
Vanadium case (supra) further rejected the view expressed by Franklin and Kaplan (page 630) 
that the right to prospect ‘amounts to a diminution of or subtraction from the full dominium of 
the owner, and as such constitutes a real right’. 
One of the factors which was considered and ultimately lead to the court’s final decision in the 
Vansa Vanadium case (supra) was, as mentioned above, the fact that the prospecting contract 
could not be registered under the Deeds Registries Act and was therefore not binding on the 
successor of the grantor. Although many writes do not agree with the judgment delivered in the 
Vansa Vanadium case (supra), to date, the case has not been challenged or overruled and the 
principles set out there in therefore remains.
48
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3.4 Conclusion  
In order to conclude on the nature of common law prospecting rights, and with regard to the 
above analysis, it can be said that a mere right to prospecting without the option to lease or 
purchase the mineral right or land to which it relates would be regarded as a personal right and 
not real right. Accordingly, due to a personal right not being regarded as immovable property, a 
common law right to prospect would not be regarded as immovable property in the normal 
meaning of the word. 
17 
 
4 Chapter 3: The words ‘immovable property’ and ‘any interest or right 
of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as provided in 
paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
4.1 Immovable property 
Following the consideration of the general meaning of the term ‘immovable property’, it has 
been determined that the term ‘immovable property’ includes incorporeal real rights in 
immovable property (i.e. in land). As the general meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ has 
now been established, it needs to be determined whether the general meaning of the term 
‘immovable property’ can be applied in the context of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Act.  
When the wording in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act is considered, it is clear that 
the term ‘immovable property’ is used four times in this section. In order to ensure that the 
correct interpretation is used when paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act is interpreted, 
one would need to consider the presumptions of interpretation of statutes. More specifically, it 
is presumed that in the instance of the same of similar words or phrases being used in various 
places within legislation, such words or phrases shall bear the same meaning throughout.
49
 It 
goes further to say that the same is true in the instance where such words or phrases refer to the 
same object.
50
 There are various authorities in which this presumption has been considered and 
also confirmed.
51
 Based on the presumptions discussed above, it is clear that one must interpret 
the term ‘immovable property’ to bear the same meaning every time it is mentioned in 
paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act.  
Upon further consideration of paragraph 2, more specifically paragraph 2(1)(b)(i), one finds that 
the term ‘immovable property’ is used twice in the same phrase or sentence. The term is firstly 
used in the phrase ‘immovable property situated in the Republic’ and thereafter in the phrase 
‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property...’ What further comes to 
light is that these two phrases are linked by the conjunction ‘or’. As mentioned in Chapter 2 
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51
 See Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26 at 33; South African Transport Services v 
Olgar and Another 1986(2) SA 684A at 688 as well as other authorities referred to in LAWSA (supra) at 
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above, the term ‘immovable property’ is not defined in the Act and accordingly, by again 
referring to the presumptions of interpretation, it is presumed that where the language of a 
legislative instrument (i.e. the Act) is not clear and is unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of the 
words must prevail.
52
 In this regard, and as pointed out in Chapter 2, the general accepted legal 
definition of the term ‘immovable property’ is land and everything which is attached to such 
land, either by way of natural or artificial means and which cannot be removed from such land 
without causing damage or without that land losing its identity (i.e. corporeal property). 
Referring to the general accepted legal meaning, it can be said that the first reference to the 
phrase ‘immovable property’ in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) refers to immovable property in its normal 
general meaning, therefore corporeal property, whilst the second reference to the phrase 
immovable property would not refer to corporeal property. 
The reason for the above analogy is due to the presumption that words or phrases are not used 
unnecessarily. Based on this particular presumption of interpretation of statutes, to the extent 
that words are regarded as being superfluous, such words cannot qualify the meaning of non-
superfluous words as this will render the applicable provision to be nugatory.
 53
 De Ville
54
 is of 
the opinion that the rule of grammatical interpretation that a meaning must be assigned to every 
word can be expressed as a rule of grammatical interpretation or as a presumption.
55
 Where it is 
expressed as a presumption, the presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact invalid 
or purposeless provisions would find application. It is however said that the presumption and 
the rule can remain distinct as the inherent validity and purposefulness of statute law is 
articulated by the presumption (i.e. its effect-directedness) while the language in which the 
effect-directness enactments will be understood is verbalised by the rule.
56
 The aforementioned 
canon of construction is recognised by a variety of case law.
57
 More specifically, in Wellworths 
Bazaars Ltd v Chandler’s Ltd58  Davis AJA said: 
‘...a Court should be slow to come to the conclusion that the words are tautologous or 
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superfluous’.  
He further quoted the Privy Council in Ditcher v Denison (11 Moore P.C. 325, at p. 357) in 
which he said: 
‘It is a good general rule in jurisprudence that one who reads a legal document 
whether public or private, should not be prompt to ascribe - should not, without 
necessity or some sound reason, impute - to its language tautology or 
superfluity, and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word 
intended to have some effect or be of some use’. 
Regardless of the fact that functional repetition is a phenomenon which is not expected to be 
present in statuary language, one should be aware of the possibility of human error and that the 
legislature ‘may have made a mistake...or may have omitted a word or added what is mere 
surplusage’.59  Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, one point of origin should be that 
different words or phrases are meant to have different meanings as the intention of the 
legislature was to express different ideas or refer to a different situation.
60
 
Furthermore, should there be a repetition of the term ‘immovable property’ in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act, such a repetition will be superfluous and can therefore not bear the 
same meaning (i.e. corporeal property). From a purely grammatical perspective, it would also 
not make grammatical sense to refer to the same concept twice, by linking the concept with the 
word ‘or’, and thereby implying it should have an alternative meaning (i.e. a building or a 
building). The reference to ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable 
property...’ can therefore not refer to corporeal property, but would rather refer to incorporeal 
property.  
The above leads us to the conclusion that the first reference to immovable property in paragraph 
2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act does not include incorporeal property as the second time the 
phrase ‘immovable property’ is referred to, reference is made to ‘any interest or right of 
whatever nature to or in immovable property...’ which, by implication, includes a right to 
property (i.e. corporeal) and such a right to property, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, is 
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incorporeal. 
Although it has now been established that reference to the term ‘immovable property’ and the 
phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property...’ in paragraph 
2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act bears different meanings, the term ‘immovable 
property’ referred to in these phrases will still bear the same meaning (i.e. corporeal property). 
This is also based on the general rule of the presumption discussed above which provides that 
different words or phrases are meant to have different meanings
61
, however, there are exceptions 
to the general rule.
62
 In this regard, where an ex abundanti cautela (repetition in different terms) 
occurs, it is presumed that such a repetition shall bear the same meaning.
63
  
Before coming to the conclusion that the term ‘immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Act excludes any reference to incorporeal property, it might be useful 
to consider other paragraphs within the Eighth Schedule to the Act which makes reference to the 
term ‘immovable property’. This is necessary in order to determine whether giving the term 
‘immovable property’ a restrictive meaning to only include corporeal property can be 
consistently applied throughout the Eighth Schedule to the Act.  
The term ‘immovable property’ is referred to in multiple paragraphs within the Eighth Schedule 
to the Act. More often than not, where the term ‘immovable property’ occurs, it is often used in 
conjunction with the phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable 
property’. A conclusion can therefore be drawn that, in the majority of the instances where the 
term ‘immovable property’ is used in the Eighth Schedule to the Act, a wider meaning is 
attributed to such term. This is, however, not the case when one refers to paragraph 57 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act. This paragraph addresses the implication upon the disposal of small 
business assets. In this paragraph, an ‘active business asset’ is defined as ‘an asset which 
constitutes immovable property, to the extent that it is used for business purposes...’. Upon strict 
interpretation of this definition, one could come to the view that this definition is restricting the 
term ‘immovable property’ to only include corporeal property. The reason being is that there is 
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no reference to ‘any interest of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ in this definition. 
This occurrence is also true for the wording in paragraph 57A of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
It may therefore be said that the legislature’s intention with the term ‘immovable property’ in 
this section should bear a wider meaning and thereby including a right to immovable property. 
The intention of the legislature with the wording in this section is however not directly relevant 
to the issue at hand.  
The meaning of the term ‘immovable property’ was also the subject of a Zimbabwean case as 
well as in the case of Berry v Mann
64
. In ITC 1610
65
 (the Zimbabwean Special Court case), the 
court had to decide on the meaning of the term ‘specified asset’ as defined in section 2(1) of the 
Zimbabwean Capital Gains Tax Act 54 of 1981 (‘the Zimbabwean CGT Act’). The 
Zimbabwean CGT Act defined a ‘specified asset’ as ‘immovable property and any marketable 
security’. The facts of the case can be summarised as follows: 
 The appellant entered into an agreement with the state to lease certain state land and the 
agreement also included an option to purchase the land from the state. 
 Due to drought and poor farming conditions, the appellant decided to move and he sold 
the farm together with the option (the option was sold for ZIM$168 000). 
 The Commissioner of Taxes initially included the sale price of the option as part of 
taxable income, but subsequently amended the assessment to include the sale price of 
ZIM$168 000 as a capital gain. 
 The appellant argued that an option was not a ‘specified asset’ as defined in section 2(1) 
of the Zimbabwean CGT Act and the legislature did not intend to include ‘anything 
which could be classified as immovable property’ in the meaning of a ‘specified asset’. 
 The Commissioner of Taxes argued that ‘the option was a right relating to immovable 
property and accordingly must itself be classified as immovable property’. 
The court referred to various writers with regards to the law of property
66
 and that based on 
these authors, with specific reference to Wille in Principles of South African Law 7ed at page 
166, ‘incorporeals are classified as movable or immovable, depending upon the property to 
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which they attach’. The court was, however, of the view that the authorities quoted in support of 
the submission did not support this fact. The principle which the court found to be applicable in 
this specific case was that articulated by Bristowe J in the Master of the Supreme Court
67
 case at 
page 570 where he said: 
‘It seems to me that in these sections movable and immovable are used in a 
contradictory sense. Whatever is not movable is intended to be classed as immovable, 
and whatever is not immovable is intended to be classed as movable. The two in fact 
divide the world between them. Assuming then that the lease of a township stand falls 
under one of these heads, under which of them does it come? The answer to this 
question is, I think, furnished by Van der Keessel, who says (Thes 178 and 179) that 
although incorporeal things are not strictly either movable or immovable, yet it 
becomes necessary to refer them to one or other of these classes then praedial 
servitudes and actions in rem should be considered as immovables, and actions in 
personam should be reckoned as movables.’ 
Based on the above, the court was of the view that when the term ‘immovable property’ is 
considered, the starting position would be the proposition that an incorporeal right such as an 
option is not strictly movable or immovable property. The court held that where there is no clear 
indication in the Zimbabwean CGT Act that illustrates that the legislature intended for 
incorporeal property (such as an option) to be included in the term ‘immovable property’, that 
such incorporeal property should not be included. The court further stated that the imposition of 
a tax must be effected by plain words and referred to the principle in Brunton v Stamp Duties 
Commissioners
68
 (at page 760) where Lord Atkinson stated: 
‘It is well established that one is bound, in construing Revenue Acts, to give a fair and 
reasonable construction to their language without leaning to one side or to the other, 
that no tax can be imposed on a subject by an Act of Parliament without words in it 
clearly showing an intention to lay the burden upon him, that the words of the statute 
must be adhered to, and that so-called equitable constructions of them are not 
permissible.’ 
In support of the above, and with reference to Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue 
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Commissioners
69
, the following concept expressed by Rowlatt J was quoted: 
‘It is urged by Sir William Finlay that in a taxing Act clear words are necessary in 
order to tax the subject. Too wide and fanciful a construction is often sought to be given 
to that maxim, which does not mean that words are to be unduly restricted against the 
Crown, or that there is to be any discrimination against the Crown in those Acts. It 
simply means in a taxing Act one has to look more at what is clearly said. There is no 
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read in, 
nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.’ 
In light of the above, the court held that it could not find anything in the Zimbabwean CGT Act 
which clearly shows the intention to impose capital gains tax on the disposal of incorporeals. 
The Commissioner of Taxes was therefore ordered to amend the assessment to not include the 
disposal of the option as a capital gain.  
In addition to the above, in Berry v Mann (supra) the court had to decide whether the subject 
matter of a contract was an interest in immovable property or not. In essence, the court had to 
determine whether the owner of immovable property could in fact purchase the option from 
another person which such a person has over the immovable property of the owner. This 
decision was based on the wording of Section 1 of Law 12 1884 (Natal) which read as follows: 
‘No action shall be maintained in respect of any contract for the sale of any immovable 
property or any interest therein . . . unless and so far as such contract shall be 
evidenced by some writing signed by or on behalf of the person sought to be bound 
thereby.’ 
With reference to Pothier, Contrat de Vente, 1.2.8. and Hopper v Cochran (1934, TPD at p. 
327),
70
 the court held that a man cannot buy his own property. It could, however, be said that ‘if 
a certain person has rights against that property derogating from the rights of ownership he can 
buy out that person, but then he buys the rights that the person has in respect of that property’. 
The respondent argued that the interest itself must be immovable property for such interest to in 
fact be regarded as immovable property. This argument was, however, rejected by the court. 
The reason for the court rejecting this argument could be articulated by the following: 
‘If it were correct, the words “or interest therein” following “immovable property” 
would become redundant, because the interest, ex hypothesi, being immovable property 
itself, would be included in the term, “immovable property” and thus the words “or 
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interest therein” would have been unnecessary. There can be no doubt that by using the 
words “or interest therein” in the alternative the Legislature must have intended to 
describe something different from immovable property.’ 
The above case law provides support that when considering the term ‘immovable property’ read 
with the phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’, it must be 
said that the two phrases must have different meanings, and therefore, that immovable property 
as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act only refers to corporeal property. 
4.2 Conclusion  
To conclude on the discussion above, it can be said that the term ‘immovable property’ as used 
in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act should be limited to only include corporeal 
property and not corporeal and incorporeal property. 
4.3 Any interest or right to or in immovable property 
Based on the view expressed in 4.1 above, the term ‘immovable property’ in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act only refers to corporeal property. A similar approach to that adopted 
in 4.1 above needs to be taken in order to determine the meaning of the phrase ‘any interest or 
right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as referred to in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act. 
As discussed in detail in 3.1 above, one can distinguish between a real right and a personal 
right. A further distinction can be drawn between a real right which relates to one’s own 
property (ius in re propria) and a real right which relates to things belonging to someone else 
(iura in re aliena).
71
 Silberberg and Schoeman (supra) go further to say that an iura in re aliena 
(i.e. a right to something which belongs to someone else) is a limited real right due to the fact 
that it is a real right although there is no ownership and is a thing which is owned by another 
person which does not hold such right. It can therefore be said that the reference to the word 
‘right’ in the phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ 
would include a real right and a limited real right to corporeal property.  
The approach to be followed in order to come to a view of what exactly is meant by the term 
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‘interest’ is not as straightforward as the one followed above. One of the reasons why difficulty 
is experience when conducting this analysis is due to the fact that in most of the authorities in 
which this term is discussed, reference is made to the term in the context of the statute in which 
it appears. However, in Pito v Deeb
72
 the words ‘interest direct or indirect in a...business’ was 
considered. The Pito v Deeb case (supra) dealt with the breach of a restraint of trade clause. In 
this case, Mr George Deeb (the respondent) sold a business to the applicant. Clause 7 of the 
deed of sale read as follows: 
‘To protect the interests of the purchaser, the seller as well as the said George Deeb 
will not be entitled to open or have any interest direct or indirect in a café or restaurant 
business in the town of Lindley for a period of five (5) years as from date hereof.’ 
Without going into too much detail, the court ruled that Mr Deeb does not have a café or that it 
carries on a business as such. The court did, however, continue to consider whether Mr Deeb 
has ‘any interest direct or indirect’ (as provided in clause 7 of the deed of sale) in the said 
business and whether such a business is a café or not. Referring to Olley v Maasdorp and 
Another
73
 and Roopsingh v Rural Licensing Board for Lower Tugela and Others
74
, it was 
submitted that the meaning of the word ‘interest’ may differ depending on the interpretation of 
different statutes and that same will hold true upon the interpretation of contracts. Further 
reference was made to Gophir Diamond Co. v Wood
75
 (which relied on Smith v Hancock 1894 
(2) Ch. C. 377) in which it was held that where an employee is merely drawing a salary, that 
such an employee will not have an indirect pecuniary interest in the business.  
Erasmus J pointed out that Beyers J, in Scheckter v Kolbe
76
, was ‘at a loss to understand’ why 
the judge in the Gophir Diamond Company case (supra) case should give the word ‘interested’ 
such a restrictive meaning. In the Gophir Diamond Company case (supra), Swinfen Eady J said:  
‘If his remuneration in any way depended on the profits or gross returns, he would be 
“interested” in the business, but the mere fact that he is employed as a servant at a 
fixed salary gives him no such interest and constitutes no breach of his covenant.’ 
The court agreed with the view expressed in the Scheckter case (supra) that a distinction can be 
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drawn between a person ‘becoming interested’ in a business and a person ‘interesting himself’ 
in a business. It was therefore held that in order for a person to have an ‘interest in a business’, 
such a person must have a proprietary right or a stake in the business. The mere fact that an 
employee only earns a salary from a business, without having a pecuniary interest in such 
business, cannot be regarded as having an indirect interest in the business. The ordinary 
meaning of the phrase ‘interested in’ is therefore only where a person has a proprietary right or 
a stake in the business. 
4.4 Conclusion  
Based on the above discussion, the conclusion can therefore be reached that the phrase ‘any 
interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ means that there must be a 
proprietary right or a stake in immovable property (i.e. corporeal property) and by implication, 
refers to incorporeal property (i.e. a right to corporeal property). 
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5 Chapter 4: The nature of prospecting rights and mining rights  
5.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, it has been concluded that when considering the general legal 
meaning of the term ‘immovable property’, mining rights and prospecting rights would be 
regarded as immovable property in the ordinary sense thereof. Putting the general legal meaning 
aside and considering the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, mining 
rights and prospecting rights will not be regarded as immovable property as used in paragraph 2 
of the Eighth Schedule to the Act as they are regarded as incorporeal property. This is based on 
the conclusion in Chapter 3 that the term ‘immovable property’, as used in Paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act, only refers to corporeal property. This does, however, not mean that 
mining rights and prospecting rights would not fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act as a result of those rights being regarded as incorporeal property, 
they could fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act based on the 
wording ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ which refers to 
incorporeal property. 
5.2 Legal nature of prospecting rights and mining rights 
When considering prospecting rights, and with reference to the Vansa Vanadium case (supra), it 
can be said that, based on the common law right to prospect, such a right would not be regarded 
as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ to the extent that the 
right to prospect does not provide the option to lease or purchase the mineral right or land to 
which it relates. Dale
77
 concludes that the common law concept ascribed to mineral rights have 
been, to an extent, abolished by the introduction of the MPRDA, more specifically, section 2(a) 
and 2(b) as well as section 3(1) and 3(2) of the MPRDA. This is due to mineral rights ceasing to 
exist within the transitional periods of 1, 2 and 5 years (based the aforementioned sections, 
including Schedule II to the MRPDA).  
The rationale for the above statement is due to the wording that can be found in section 4 of the 
MPRDA. Section 4 of the MPRDA reads as follows: 
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‘(1) When interpreting a provision of this Act, any reasonable interpretation which is 
consistent with the objects of this Act must be preferred over any other 
interpretation which is inconsistent with such objects. 
 (2)  In so far as the common law is inconsistent with this Act, this Act prevails.’ 
It is clear from the above wording that the MPRDA will take preference where there is a 
conflict between common law and the MPRDA. In this regard, Dale (supra) is of the view that 
section 4(2) of the MRPDA needs to be considered in light of the normal principle of statutory 
interpretation in that the legislature intends to depart from the common law as little as possible. 
Dale (supra) continues to state that this specific principle of statutory interpretation needs to be 
read with section 4(1) of the MPRDA. As a result of the of the MPRDA taking preference over 
the common law where inconsistencies exist, the nature of the rights granted under the MPRDA 
need to be considered to determine whether the nature would be similar to that established based 
on common law. 
The first port of call in determining what is the nature of prospecting rights and mining rights 
would be section 5 of the MPRDA. The heading of section 5 of the MPRDA reads ‘Legal 
nature of prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production right, and rights of 
holders thereof’. In this regard, section 5 of the MPRDA provides the following: 
‘5(1) A prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production right granted in 
terms of this Act and registered in terms of the Mining Titles Registration Act, 
1967, (Act No. 16 of 1967), is a limited real right in respect of the mineral or 
petroleum and the land to which such right relates. 
(2) The holder of a prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production 
right is entitled to the rights referred to in this section and such other rights as may 
be granted to, acquired by or conferred upon such holder under this Act or any 
other law. 
(3) Subject to this Act, any holder of a prospecting right, a mining right, exploration 
right or production right may— 
 (a) enter the land to which such right relates together with his or her 
employees, and bring onto that land any plant, machinery or equipment 
and build, construct or lay down any surface, underground or under sea 
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infrastructure which may be required for the purpose of prospecting, 
mining, exploration or production, as the case may be; 
  (b) prospect, mine, explore or produce, as the case may be, for his or her own 
account on or under that land for the mineral or petroleum for which such 
right has been granted; 
 (c) remove and dispose of any such mineral found during the course of 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production, as the case may be; 
 (cA) subject to section 59B of the Diamonds Act, 1986 (Act No. 56 of 1986), (in 
the case of diamond) remove and dispose of any diamond found during the 
course of mining operations; 
  (d) subject to the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998), use water 
from any natural spring, lake, river or stream, situated on, or flowing 
through, such land or from any excavation previously made and used for 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production purposes, or sink a well or 
borehole required for use relating to prospecting, mining, exploration or 
production on such land; and 
 (e) carry out any other activity incidental to prospecting, mining, exploration or 
production operations, which activity does not contravene the provisions of 
this Act.’ 
In addition to the above, sections 19(1) and 25(1) of the MPRDA also provide for additional 
rights and obligations with regard to the holders of prospecting rights and mining rights 
respectively. In this regard, section 19(1) provides as follows: 
‘(1) In addition to the rights referred to in section 5, the holder of a prospecting right 
has— 
(a) subject to section 18, the exclusive right to apply for and be granted a 
renewal of the prospecting right in respect of the mineral and prospecting 
area in question; 
(b) subject to subsection (2), the exclusive right to apply for and be granted a 
mining right in respect of the mineral and prospecting area in question; and 
30 
 
(c) subject to the permission referred to in section 20, the exclusive right to 
remove and dispose of any mineral to which such right relates and which is 
found during the course of prospecting.’ 
 
Section 25(1), with regard to the rights and obligations of holders of mining rights, states as 
follows: 
‘(1) In addition to the rights referred to in section 5, the holder of a mining right has, 
subject to section 24, the exclusive right to apply for and be granted a renewal of the 
mining right in respect of the mineral and mining area in question.’ 
The above sections in the MPRDA clearly stipulates that a mining right is a limited real right. In 
this regard, and based on the analogy set out earlier in this research report, a limited real right to 
property is incorporeal and accordingly, would not be regarded as immovable property as the 
term is used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. Regardless of this, due to the fact 
that a mining right entitles the holder thereof to minerals which is situated in the land, such a 
right would be regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable 
property’ as set out in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
Similar reasons those stated above can be relied on to determine the nature of a prospecting 
right. The difference, however, is whether a prospecting right in fact entitles the holder to the 
minerals found in the land. The MPRDA regards a prospecting right as a limited real right as the 
MPRDA presumably regards a prospecting right as a right to the land on which the holder can 
prospect as well as the minerals situated in the land. It could, however, be argued that a 
prospecting right is a limited real right, but this will only be the case to the extent that a 
prospector is in fact entitled to remove the minerals from the land. Section 20 of the MPRDA 
contains the answer to this question. As set out above, section 19 provides for the rights of the 
holder of a prospecting right. Section 19(1)(c) of the MPRDA specifically provides that a holder 
of a prospecting right has ‘the exclusive right to remove and dispose of any mineral to which 
such right relates and which is found during the course of prospecting’, however, such an 
exclusive right is subject to section 20 of the MPRDA. Section 20 of the MPRDA provides that  
‘(1) Subject to subsection (2), the holder of a prospecting right may only remove and 
dispose for his or her own account any mineral found by such holder in the course of 
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prospecting operations conducted pursuant to such prospecting right in such 
quantities as may be required to conduct tests on it or to identify or analyse it. 
(2) The holder of a prospecting right must obtain the Minister’s written permission to 
remove and dispose for such holder’s own account of diamonds and bulk samples of 
any other minerals found by such holder in the course of prospecting operations.’ 
The provisions of section 20(1) which, in addition to section 19, stipulate that the holder of a 
prospecting right may remove and dispose for its own account any minerals found while 
conducting prospecting operations, is also subject to the provisions of section 20(2). In terms of 
section 20(2), and as can be seen from the extract above, a prospecting right holder must firstly 
obtain the written consent from the Minister of the Department of Mineral Resources before 
minerals can be removed and disposed of for the holder’s own account. In the recent 
amendment bill to the MPRDA
78
, a proposed change is made to the wording of section 20(2). It 
is proposed that the section provides as follows: 
‘The holder of a prospecting right shall not without the prior written permission of the 
Minister remove bulk samples of any mineral from a prospecting area for any purpose 
subject to such conditions as the Minister may determine.’ 
Furthermore, it is also proposed that an additional sub-section to section 20, section 20(3), be 
inserted to the MPRDA. The proposed section 20(3) will read as follows: 
‘(3) Any person who applies for permission to remove and dispose of minerals in terms 
of this section must obtain an environmental authorisation if such person has not done 
so in terms of section 16 (4) (c) of this Act.’ 
When considering the MPRDA as it is currently worded, it is clear that the holder of a 
prospecting right must firstly obtain the approval from the Minister before it can remove and 
dispose of minerals found while conducting prospecting operations. On this score alone, a 
prospecting right should in fact not be regarded as a limited real right as provided in section 5 of 
the MPRDA as a prospecting right in itself does not entitle the holder thereof to land or minerals 
contained therein. Taking into account the proposed changes to the MPRDA, an additional 
approval from an environmental perspective and in terms of section 16(4) of the MPRDA is 
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required before the prospecting right holder will be allowed to remove and dispose of minerals 
for its own account. It can therefore be said that due to the provisions of section 20(2) and the 
proposed section 20(3), the holder of a prospecting right does not have the unreserved right to 
any minerals found while conducting its prospecting operations and there is therefore not a 
limited real right to minerals as suggested in section 5(3)(c) of the MPRDA. It is submitted that 
a prospecting right does not give rise to a limited real right to minerals and therefore property. 
Although a prospecting right would be regarded as a limited real right in terms of common law 
and based on the MPRDA, a prospecting right would not be regarded immovable property or 
‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as provided in paragraph 
2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act based on the analysis of immovable property in Chapter 2. 
SARS, in its ‘Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax’ (Issue 4) (‘the SARS CGT Guide’), 
does not agree with the view that a prospecting right should not be regarded as immovable 
property.
79
 In the SARS CGT Guide, it is indicated that ‘new order rights under the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 comprise immovable property’. When 
further considering SARS’ CGT Guide it becomes apparent that the view that new order rights 
comprise of immovable property is based on section 5(1) of the MPRDA as well as specific 
reference to section 5(3) of the MPRDA. The SARS CGT guide provides that ‘The holder of 
such a right is entitled to access the land [s 5(3)(a)], prospect, mine, explore or produce [s 
5(3)(b)], and remove and dispose of any minerals found [s 5(3)(c)].’ The classification of new 
order rights (which includes prospecting rights and mining rights) as immovable property, is 
furthermore based on the characteristics of immovable property. In this regard, the SARS CGT 
Guide provides that a new order right and immovable property share the following 
characteristics: 
‘it is a real right (albeit limited),  
it is ‘in respect of’ the mineral and the related land (these words imply a close causal 
connection with the mineral and the land),  
the subject matter of the right can only be removed by causing damage to the land (the 
land has to be excavated to extract the mineral), and  
it is not dissimilar to a long-term lease, a usufruct or a servitude, all of which are rights 
of enjoyment of immovable property.’ 
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A question that can be asked is whether the SARS CGT Guide in fact considered a prospecting 
right in isolation and whether the above view would change should it be considered in isolation. 
Putting this question aside for the moment, although the view expressed in the SARS CGT 
Guide can be supported that a prospecting right and mining right are limited real rights and 
immovable property based on the common law, following from the analysis in Chapter 2, it 
cannot be said that a prospecting right and a mining right constitutes immovable property as this 
term is used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
5.3 Conclusion  
The analogy set out above together with that in the previous chapters, leads to the following 
conclusions: 
 A mining right granted in terms of the MPRDA should not be regarded as ‘immovable 
property’ as referred to in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act and similarly, a 
prospecting right granted in terms of the MPRDA should also not be regarded as 
‘immovable property’ as referred to in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
 Due to the fact that a mining right is a limited real right which entitles the holder of 
such mining right to the minerals situated in the land over which the mining right was 
granted, a mining right issued in terms of the MPRDA would be regarded as ‘any 
interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’. 
 Two opposing views can be reached as to whether a prospecting right granted in terms 
of the MPRDA would be regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
immovable property’ or not. Firstly, should the above analogy be followed whereby it is 
contented that due to the approvals required from the Minister in terms of section 20 of 
the MPRDA, a prospecting right without such approvals would not be regarded as ‘any 
interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ as there is no right to 
minerals in the land on which it is conducting prospecting operations until such time as 
the approval has obtained or a mining right granted. Secondly, to the extent that the 
holder of a prospecting right granted in terms of the MPRDA also obtained the 
necessary approvals from the Minister as provided in section 20 of the MPRDA, such a 
prospecting right would be regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
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immovable property’ as it also entitles the holder of such prospecting right to the 
mineral situated in the land on which it is conducting prospecting operations.  
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6 Chapter 5: Interpretation of paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act 
It has now been established that although a prospecting right or mining right would not be 
regarded as immovable property as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, a 
mining right would be regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable 
property’ and a prospecting right, to the extent that the consent from the Minister is obtained as 
provided in section 20 of the MPRDA, would also constitute ‘any interest or right of whatever 
nature to or in immovable property’. Paragraph 2(2) continues to expand on what is meant by 
the phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’. Paragraph 2(2) 
of the Eighth Schedule to the Act provides that: 
‘(2)  For purposes of subparagraph (1)(b)(i), an interest in immovable property situated 
in the Republic includes any equity shares held by a person in a company or 
ownership or the right to ownership of a person in any other entity or a vested 
interest of a person in any assets of any trust, if— 
(a) 80 per cent or more of the market value of those equity shares, ownership or 
right to ownership or vested interest, as the case may be, at the time of 
disposal thereof is attributable directly or indirectly to immovable property 
held otherwise than as trading stock; and 
(b) in the case of a company or other entity, that person (whether alone or 
together with any connected person in relation to that person), directly or 
indirectly, holds at least 20 per cent of the equity shares in that company or 
ownership or right to ownership of that other entity.’ 
 
The above section provides substance as to what the legislature intended when referring to the 
phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ and it is therefore 
not necessary to determine what the meaning of this phrase is.  
Paragraph 2(2)(a) provides that ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable 
property’ firstly includes any equity shares and that, secondly, in order for ‘any interest or right 
of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ to exist, 80% or more of the market value of 
such equity shares needs to be attributed to immovable property. It becomes apparent that the 
requirement is for 80% of the market value of the equity shares to be attributed to ‘immovable 
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property’ and not ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’. It could 
therefore be said that, based on the analysis’s in Chapter 3 which determined what is meant by 
the term ‘immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, the 
value of the equity shares must be attributed to corporeal property and not any rights to or in 
such corporeal property.  
Based on the discussion in Chapter 4 where it was concluded that prospecting rights granted 
under the MPRDA do not constitute corporeal property and therefore not immovable property 
as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, a view is put forward that the value of 
prospecting rights held by the holder should not be attributed to immovable property as referred 
to in paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act when conducting the 80% analysis. A 
similar view can be taken when considering mining rights. As concluded in Chapter 4, a mining 
right is a limited real right which entitles the holder of such mining right to the minerals situated 
in the land over which the mining right was granted and it would therefore constitute ‘any 
interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’. Following the above analysis, 
the 80% requirement provided for in paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act should 
only be conducted with regards to immovable property as the term is used in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act. The value attributed to a mining right granted in terms of the 
MPRDA should therefore not be attributed to immovable property as a mining right is regarded 
incorporeal property and immovable property, as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act, only refers to corporeal property. 
In addition to the above, the reference to the words ‘directly or indirectly’ indicates that 
consideration should not only be given to immovable property held by the company in which a 
shareholder holds shares, but also to any immovable property held by any other company in 
which such a company holds a shareholding. This view is also illustrated in the SARS CGT 
Guide which supports the fact that a ‘look through’ approach needs to be adopted.80 
The view expressed above that the value of mining rights and prospecting rights should not be 
included when conducting the 80% analysis could be seen as a robust interpretation. The reason 
being is that taking such a view could be regarded as ignoring the intention of the legislature 
and taking such a view could potentially give rise to a result which is unfair, unjust or 
unreasonable. A question which can be asked is whether the legislature inserted paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Act whilst having the direct or indirect disposal of prospecting rights 
or mining rights in mind. In order to potentially provide an answer to this question, 
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consideration could be given to the explanatory memorandum to Act 19 of 2001 which inserted 
paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act.
81
 
The Explanatory Memorandum Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2001
82
 states as follows 
regarding paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act: 
‘The paragraph proposes a distinction between a resident, which is a defined word in 
section 1, and a non-resident. It is proposed that- 
• a resident be subject to CGT on the disposal of any asset whether in the 
Republic or outside, 
• a non-resident be subject to CGT on the disposal of- 
(i) any immovable property or any interest or right in immovable 
property situated in the Republic, 
(ii) any asset of a permanent establishment of the non-resident through 
which a trade is carried on in the Republic. 
 
It is proposed that the term "an interest in immovable property situated in the Republic" 
which is held by a non-resident, be broadened. It is proposed that it include a direct or 
indirect interest of at least 20 per cent held by a person (together with a connected 
person in relation to that person) in the equity share capital of a company or other 
entity, where 80 per cent or more of the market value of the net asset value of the 
company or other entity at the time of disposal is attributable to immovable property 
situated in the Republic.’ 
The above part of the Explanatory Memorandum Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2001 does 
not provide any additional insight into paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act than what 
is already provided in the Act. It is therefore not clear from the above extract whether, at the 
time when paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act was inserted, consideration was given 
to the direct or indirect disposal of prospecting rights or mining rights. The analysis on what 
exactly the intention was of the legislature when paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
was inserted and whether such an intention in actual fact considered the direct or indirect 
disposal of prospecting rights or mining rights is dealt with below.  
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6.1 Conclusion 
To conclude on the above analysis and by taking into account any arguments put forward in the 
previous chapters, the following conclusions could be reached: 
 Both prospecting rights and mining rights granted in terms of the MPRDA would not be 
regarded as immovable property as that term is used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act.  
 Due to a mining right being regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
immovable property’ and a prospecting right, at best, being regarded as the same (to the 
extent that approvals required from the Minister in terms of section 20 of the MPRDA 
is granted), the direct or indirect disposal of a prospecting right or mining right could 
fall within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
 Although a prospecting right and mining right would be regarded as ‘any interest or 
right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ when conducting the 80% 
analysis provided for in paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, a robust 
interpretation is that the value of a mining right or prospecting right would not be 
attributed to immovable property as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule 
to the Act.   
 A conservative approach could, however, be adopted to include and attribute the value 
of a mining right to immovable property as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act.   
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7 Chapter 6: Prospecting right and prospecting information 
In Chapter 5 above, it was concluded that a prospecting right granted in terms of the MPRDA 
would firstly not be regarded as immovable property as provided in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act and secondly, that the value of prospecting right should not be attributed to 
immovable property as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act when 
conducting the 80% analysis. To the extent that it is argued that a prospecting right is in fact 
immovable property as envisaged in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act and its value 
would therefore be included in the 80% analysis, consideration should be given as to how to 
determine the value of a prospecting right.  
The market value of a prospecting right would, based on case law,
83
 be regarded as the amount 
which a willing seller and a willing buyer of such a prospecting right would agree to if they 
negotiated on an equal footing and to the extent that both parties were fully informed of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the potential of the prospecting right and the underlying land 
to which the prospecting right relates. It should also be noted that when the value of a 
prospecting right is being determined, consideration should be given to the value of the 
prospecting right itself, as well as the information gained while conducting prospecting 
operations. One leading case which has been followed in many subsequent decisions is the case 
of Loubser en Andere v Suid-Afrikaanse Spoorwee en Hawens 
84
. 
The Loubser case (supra) dealt with an issue regarding expropriation in which the court had to 
decide whether the value of information regarding the minerals (in this case, clay), which was 
obtained by virtue of conducting extensive tests, could be used to determine the value that 
should be paid to the owner of the land on which the minerals were situated. In the Loubser case 
(supra), the parties made two different submissions to the court. Firstly, the owner of the land 
which was being expropriated was of the view that all the information obtained through the 
extensive tests should be taken into account to determine the value which should be paid to him 
as the information related to the value of the clay situated on the land. The owner was further of 
the view that the fact that this information was obtained after expropriation is irrelevant. On the 
other hand, the view was put forward that the information should not be taken into account to 
determine the value to be paid to the owner of the land. The reason for this view is due to the 
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argument that a willing buyer and willing seller would not be aware of this information at the 
time of expropriation. Botha R rejected both these views and held: 
‘…op die getuienis, dat nòg 'n denkbeeldige koper nòg 'n denkbeeldige verkoper in die 
normale loop van sake in die ope mark voor die sluiting van 'n koopkontrak ten aansien 
van die betrokke grond die toetse op die klei sou laat uitvoer het van die soort wat die 
eisers ná die onteiening laat doen het in omstandighede waaronder die resultate 
daarvan enige invloed sou gehad het op die vasstelling van die koopprys van die 
grond….derhalwe, dat die resultate van sodanige toetse buite beskouing gelaat moes 
word…’ 
Botha J decided that where a transaction is contemplated between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller regarding the disposal of land for the purpose of exploiting the clay situated on such land, 
such a willing buyer and willing seller would insist on tests to be conducted on the clay to 
determine the value thereof. The results of such tests would thereafter be considered by the 
willing buyer and willing seller when the purchase price of the land is determined. What was, 
however, held in this specific case was that the test conducted in that instance was of such a 
magnitude from a scope and cost perspective that, in all probability, no willing seller or willing 
buyer would go through so much time, effort and expenses to conduct similar tests. The result 
of the test was therefore not included in determining the amount payable to the owner of the 
land.  
The principle that can be drawn from the above case is that where there a holder of a 
prospecting right intends to dispose of such a prospecting right, and the holder is also privy to 
knowledge of the nature and value of minerals situated on a specific piece of land, a purchaser 
would in all probability be willing to pay more to acquire such a prospecting right and the 
information attached thereto. A question that may be asked is whether the value of such 
knowledge should be attributed to the prospecting right where such knowledge is not available 
in the public domain. In Lynell and Another v Inland Revenue Commissioners
85
 it had to be 
decided whether confidential information not known to the public could be used in order to 
determine the value of a deceased estate for purposes of determining estate duty. In the Lynell 
and Another case (supra) it was held that: 
‘…facts that would be unknown to the hypothetical purchaser should be left out of 
account in assessing the value of shares pursuant to s 7(5) of the Finance Act, 1894, 
and in the present case the company’s accounts for the financial year ending 31 July 
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1962, and the chairman’s speech at the annual general meeting on 7 June 1962, should 
be disregarded, as they would not have been known to the hypothetical purchaser at 
Mrs L’s death in May, 1962…’ 
It is therefore clear from the above that confidential information which is not known to the 
public should not be included when valuing the shares of a company. 
It can be seen from the above two cases that the information which is attached to an asset (i.e. in 
the first case attached to the land and in the second case attached to the shares) can have a 
significant impact on the value of the actual asset itself. When this analogy is applied to a 
prospecting right, a conclusion can be drawn that the information which is gathered while 
conducting prospecting information would be extremely valuable and therefore contribute to the 
overall value of the prospecting right itself. What also becomes evident is that in this instance, 
two assets can be identified. Firstly, the prospecting right itself and secondly the information 
gathered while conducting prospecting activities. The question which now arises is what exactly 
the nature of this additional asset (i.e. the information) would be and whether this asset could be 
regarded as immovable property as provided in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
When the nature of information or data is considered, it can be said that information is not 
something that can by physically felt or touched. The only part of the information or data which 
can be physically felt or touched is the object on which the information or data is stored. This 
could include, inter alia, paper, a memory stick, a compact disc (i.e. a CD) etc. Considering the 
principles of Roman law, corporeal property was regarded as thing that could be felt or touched 
while intangible things were regarded as incorporeal property.
86
 It can therefore be said that 
intellectual property (i.e. data and knowledge), or also known as immaterial property, would be 
regarded as incorporeal property. This is confirmed by Silberberg and Schoeman (supra)
87
 
where it was said that ‘Rights such as real rights, personal rights and immaterial property 
rights are examples of incorporeals.’ 
It was already concluded is Chapter 3 that, following the analysis of Ex Parte Master of the 
Supreme Court
88
, incorporeal property can be divided into movable property and immovable 
property. The classification of incorporeal property between movable property and immovable 
property is based on the nature of the object to which the incorporeal right relates (refer to the 
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discussion in Chapter 3). In applying this to intellectual (or immaterial) property, it cannot be 
said that the object of the immaterial property is something that can be regarded as corporeal. It 
is further said that immaterial property is the tangible expression of human skills, or inventions 
of the human mind, embodied in a tangible form and which is, by law, owned by the author 
thereof.
89
 As mentioned above, the only part of information or data (i.e. intellectual property) 
which can be physically felt or touched is the object on which the information or data is stored. 
It can further be said that, based on the above reference to what constitutes immaterial property, 
where intellectual property is contained on a tangible device (i.e. a memory stick, CD etc.) the 
value of such intellectual property cannot be ascribed to the tangible device but should be 
ascribed to the actual information contained on such a device. The above discussion leads to the 
conclusion that intellectual property would be regarded as incorporeal property, however, the 
nature of the object of such incorporeal property cannot be ascribed to either movable or 
immovable property. It can therefore be concluded that intellectual property would not be 
regarded as ‘immovable property’ as that term is used in paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act.  
In applying the above to a prospecting right, it was stated above that a prospecting right consists 
of the actual right itself as well as the information gathered whilst conducting prospecting 
operations. The information gathered whilst conducting prospecting information would 
therefore not be regarded as ‘immovable property’ as that term is used in paragraph 2(2)(a) of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Act.  
Considering the above, the possibility exists that a prospecting right can be sold without the 
prospecting information or the prospecting information without the prospecting right. Instances 
where this may occur is where a prospector conducts prospecting operations and sells the 
prospecting information obtained through conducting prospecting operations to a person who is 
interested in conducting the actual mining operations. The purchaser will then either apply for a 
transfer of the current prospecting right, apply for a separate prospecting right over the same 
area on which prospecting operations is conducted or, to the extent possible, apply for a mining 
right over such an area. In order for this to occur, the current prospecting right holder would 
need to distance itself from such a prospecting right in order for the purchaser to apply for same. 
This is required due to a prospecting right not being granted over the same area to two 
respective prospectors and that the current holder of the prospecting right having the exclusive 
right to apply for a mining right. The converse to this scenario is where a person is interested in 
acquiring a prospecting right over a prospecting area, but prefers to conduct its own prospecting 
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operations. In such an instance, the holder would only dispose of the prospecting right and not 
the prospecting information gained whilst conducting prospecting operations. In both these 
instances, it should be noted that a section 11 consent in terms of the MPRDA would be 
required and furthermore, where both the prospecting right and prospecting information is 
acquired or in the event of only one of the two being acquired, a valuation would need to be 
conducted in order to attribute the purchase consideration between the prospecting right and the 
prospecting information gained.  
The valuation of the prospecting right versus the prospecting information would also be 
dependent upon the status of both assets. This statement can be illustrated by the following 
examples: 
 Where a prospector has the intention of selling prospecting information which has been 
obtained by such a prospector by virtue of conducting prospecting operations, the value 
of such prospecting information would be dependent on the status of the prospecting 
right.  
 To the extent that the prospecting right has lapsed and the prospector did not apply for 
an extension of such a prospecting right whilst another party already applied and has 
been granted a prospecting right over the prospecting area, the prospecting information 
would be of little value.  
 The reason for this is due to the fact that the prospecting information is applicable to a 
specific prospecting area and without having access to the prospecting area, the 
prospecting information cannot be utilised. 
 On the other hand, the quality of the data will depend on the extent of the prospecting 
activities that has been conducted. To the extent that the prospecting information is of a 
high quality and extensive prospecting operations have been conducted which will 
provide a potential buyer with sufficient information as to the type of quality of the 
minerals contained in the prospecting area, the value of the prospecting right would in 
all probability increase.  
 The reason for the increase in the prospecting right could indirectly be ascribed to the 
value of the minerals which could be extracted from the prospecting area. This would, 
by implication, increase the value of the right to apply for a mining right which can only 
be obtained once you are the holder of a prospecting right.  
Although there are various ways in which assets could be valued, the above examples and 
analogy with regard to the value of a prospecting right and prospecting information is merely 
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illustrative and based on common sense and general business principles. The valuation of 
prospecting rights and prospecting information (and mining rights for that matter) fall outside 
the scope of this research report and has therefore not been considered in further detail. Due to 
the specialised nature of valuations, it would in any even be prudent to obtain the input from an 
expert valuator before a value is ascribed to a prospecting right, prospecting information or a 
mining right. 
7.1 Conclusion 
In order to conclude and summarise the above analysis, the following findings can be put 
forward: 
 It is possible to distinguish a prospecting right and prospecting information as two 
separate and distinct assets. 
 Prospecting information would be regarded as intellectual property, the object of which 
cannot be ascribed to either movable or immovable property. Accordingly, prospecting 
information would not be regarded as ‘immovable property’ as that term is used in 
paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
 The value of a prospecting right and prospecting information is dependent on the status 
of both assets. In order to attribute an accurate value to either asset, the opinion of an 
expert valuator would be required.  
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8 Chapter 7: Conducting the 80% analysis 
As referred to in Chapter 5 above, paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act provides 
that an ‘interest in immovable property’ would exist where ‘80 per cent or more of the market 
value of those equity shares, ownership or right to ownership or vested interest, as the case may 
be, at the time of disposal thereof is attributable directly or indirectly to immovable property 
held otherwise than as trading stock…’ 
In order to break down the above, it can be said that paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act will be applicable if: 
 80% or more of the market value of those equity shares, as at the time of the disposal 
thereof by the non-resident, ‘is attributable directly or indirectly to immovable property’ 
situated in South Africa and held as a capital asset (i.e. otherwise than as trading stock); 
and 
 such non-resident directly or indirectly holds at least 20% of those equity shares. 
It should be noted that all of the following requirements need to be met before a non-resident 
will be subject to capital gains tax in South Africa: 
 the non-resident must directly or indirectly hold at least 20% of the equity shares being 
sold;  
 there must be immovable property situated in South Africa; and  
 80% or more of the market value of those equity shares must be attributable directly or 
indirectly to such immovable property at the time of the disposal thereof. 
Based on the above, to the extent that any of the above requirements are not met, the provisions 
of paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) and paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act will not apply. 
The methodology to be followed in how to value equity shares to determine whether the 80% 
requirement would be met is not stipulated in either the Act or the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
Some guidance is however provided in the SARS CGT Guide. The SARS CGT Guide refers to 
the following principles with reference to paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act
90
: 
 In the case of multi-tier structures the 80%+ test is determined at the top of the chain; 
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 The gross market value of the assets of the applicable company must be analysed instead 
of the market value of its net assets (i.e. any debt in the companies should be ignored);  
 The gross assets so valued must be split between movable and immovable assets to 
determine the ratio between the two broad asset classes; and 
 The value of vested rights in a trust should be included. 
The SARS CGT Guide provides that when the 80% analysis is conducted to determine whether 
80% or more of the value of shares in a company is directly or indirectly attributable to 
immovable property in South Africa ‘any liabilities in the company must be disregarded’.91 It is 
indicated that this approach is in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (‘OECD’) interpretation 156 of article 13(4) of the OECD model treaty, which 
provides as follows
92
:  
‘4. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of shares 
deriving more than 50 per cent of their value directly or indirectly from immovable 
property situated in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.’ 
On page 49 of the SARS CGT Guide, it is further provided that: 
‘For accounting purposes self-generated goodwill is not reflected in the financial 
statements of an entity.
93 
However, it is an asset forming part of the market value of the 
interest in an entity and should not be lost sight of when determining whether or not 
80% or more of an entity’s assets comprise immovable property.’ 
From the above it is clear the any asset not necessarily reflected on the balance sheet of a 
company (i.e. goodwill) must be taken into account when determining whether 80% or more of 
the value of shares in a company are directly or indirectly attributable to immovable.  
The types of interest which are regarded as constituting immovable property in South Africa 
consist of any equity shares held by a person in a company, the ownership or the right to 
ownership of a person in any other entity and a vested interest of a person in any assets of any 
trust.
94
 The SARS CGT Guide stipulates that ‘The reference to ownership or a right to 
ownership in any other entity is designed to bring within the ambit of the provision interests in 
foreign entities such as the Liechtenstein stiftung and anstalt.’ 
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Although the SARS CGT Guide provides that there will be no exception for the instances where 
shares are held in a listed South African company, it does, however, stipulate that the provisions 
of any application double tax agreement must be considered before a conclusion is made on 
whether the disposal by a non-resident will be subject to capital gains tax in South Africa
95
 (i.e. 
as provided in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act). Although the implications of any 
double tax agreement does not specifically form part of this research report, the general 
principles of a double tax agreement will be considered in order to provide context to the 
statement made in the SARS CGT Guide that the application of any double tax agreement must 
be considered before concluding on whether the disposal by a non-resident will be subject to 
capital gains tax in South Africa.  
The wording, and therefore application of double tax agreements are dependent on the country 
with which the double tax agreement has been entered into. A number of countries, including 
South Africa, currently utilises the OECD’s Model Tax Convention (‘OECD MTC’) as a 
framework for double tax agreements, thereby resulting in many double tax agreements having 
a similar structure and containing similar meanings to the different concepts. In general, Article 
13 of a double tax agreement contains the rules regarding capital gains tax. In order to illustrate 
what is referred to in the SARS CGT Guide, specific reference to the provisions of the double 
tax agreement between South Africa and Cyprus will be made.
96
 Article 13(1) of the double tax 
agreement between South Africa and Cyprus provides for the direct disposal of immovable 
property, article 13(2) provides for the disposal of movable property which forms part of the 
business property of a permanent establishment, article 13(3) provides for the disposal of ships, 
aircraft or road transport vehicles while article 13(4) provides for the disposal of any other 
property than that referred to above. Article 13(4) of the double tax agreement between South 
Africa and Cyprus reads as follows:  
‘4. Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a 
resident.’ 
Based on general legal principles, and as confirmed in the SARS CGT Guide, shares are 
movable and would therefore not be regarded as immovable property.
97
 Thus, based on the 
above summary of the respective sub-articles contained in article 13 of the double tax agreement 
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between South Africa and Cyprus, the disposal of shares would fall within the ambit of article 
13(4) of the double tax agreement between South Africa and Cyprus.
98
 This will result in the 
disposal of the shares, regardless of whether it is attributed to immovable property or  not, not 
being taxable in South Africa to the extent that the person disposing of such shares is a resident 
in Cyprus for tax purposes. It is for this precise reason that many offshore investors prefer to 
enter the South African market through favourable tax jurisdictions like Cyprus, Mauritius, 
Luxembourg or the Netherlands. It should however be noted that South Africa is in the process 
of re-negotiating and amended various DTAs which will, if implemented, result in the taxing 
right being granted to South Africa where a disposal in a property rich company is are involved. 
The DTA as is reads on the day of disposal should therefore be considered.  
To apply the above principles to the 80% analysis, a view exists that when the market value of 
the company has been calculated, such a market value is attributed to each asset held by the 
company (excluding any debt claim such a company would have) in the same ratio as the asset 
as that asset relates over the total assets. The assets to which the market value has been 
attributed is thereafter split between movable assets and immovable assets. Up until this point, 
the method seems to be very similar to the guidance provided in the SARS CGT Guide. The 
above method goes further to the guidance provided in the SARS CGT Guide and attributes any 
‘excess’ amount left over after a value has been attributed to all the assets to the mining right, 
prospecting right or prospecting information, as the case may be. The flaw in this method is that 
the excess amount attributed to either the mining right, prospecting right or prospecting 
information might not be the true reflection of the actual value of such mining right, prospecting 
right or prospecting information and that the value would only be obtained once a thorough 
valuation has been conducted on these assets. Due to the novel nature of these calculations and 
the fact that the method followed in conducting these calculations has not been adjudicated by 
our courts, it is difficult to provide a firm view as to the correctness of this approach and 
whether it would be accepted in a court of law.  
8.1 Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, although there is not a prescribed method which could be 
implemented when determining whether 80% or more of the value of shares in a company is 
directly or indirectly attributable to immovable, the SARS CGT Guide provides some general 
guidelines. What again becomes apparent is that in order to conduct the 80% analysis, the 
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market value of the assets (of the gross assets based on the SARS CGT Guide) is required 
which, by implication, requires a valuation to be conducted. As concluded in Chapter 6 above, 
the opinion of an expert valuator would be required when attempting to establish and attribute 
values to assets (with specific reference to prospecting right, mining rights and prospecting 
information).  The applicability of any relevant double tax agreement should also be borne in 
mind before the 80% analysis is conducted.  
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9 Chapter 8: Conclusion  
The chapters in this research report have undertaken a technical review of the various forms of 
rights in terms of Roman law (and Roman Dutch law) in order to determine the common law 
meaning of the word ‘immovable property’. This led us to the subsequent interpretation of the 
term ‘immovable property’ as well as the phrase ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or 
in immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. This was 
necessary in order to determine whether a prospecting right, prospecting information or a 
mining right would be regarded as immovable property as provided in paragraph 2 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act which, if true, could result in non-resident shareholders disposing of shares 
in South African companies holding prospecting rights, mining rights or a combination of both 
being subject to South African capital gains tax upon the disposal of their interests.  
To summarise the conclusions reached in the respective chapters of this research report, it can 
be said that ‘immovable property’ is generally regarded as land and everything which is 
attached to such land, either by way of natural or artificial means, and which cannot be removed 
from such land without causing damage to that land or without that land losing its identity.
99
  
When considering the meaning of the word ‘immovable property as used in paragraph 2 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act, such a term refers to corporeal property and would not include any 
incorporeal property. Although a prospecting right and a mining right would be regarded as a 
limited real right, neither a prospecting right nor a mining right would be regarded as 
immovable property as that term is used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. A 
mining right would, however, be regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
immovable property’. A prospecting right on the other hand, could be regarded as ‘any interest 
or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ depending on the consents obtained 
from the Minister of the Department of Mineral Resources. Prospecting information would not 
be regarded as ‘immovable property’ or ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in 
immovable property’. 
Although a mining right and potentially a prospecting right would be regarded as ‘any interest 
or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ and by implication result in the 
application of paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, consideration would 
firstly be given to the 80% analysis. The fact that a prospecting right or mining right could be 
regarded as ‘any interest or right of whatever nature to or in immovable property’ would not by 
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implication result in the 80% requirement being met. The possibility exists that when an 
analysis is conducted on the assets of a company and a split is done between movable assets and 
immovable assets, more than 20% of the market value of the shares of a company could be 
attributed to movable property, resulting the 80% requirement not being met (regardless of the 
presence of a prospecting right or mining right). It is for this reason imperative that a valuation 
is obtained from an expert and that such a valuation is accurately attributed to the respective 
assets owned by the company.  
To the extent that the 80% requirement is in fact met, a further possibility exists that, depending 
on the jurisdiction of the non-resident shareholder, a favourable double tax agreement could be 
in place between South Africa and such a jurisdiction. This could therefore result in South 
Africa not being awarded the taxing right upon the disposal of shares where 80% or more of the 
market value of the shares in the company is attributed to immovable property situated in South 
Africa.  
The applicability of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act to the disposal by non-
resident shareholders of shares in a South African company which hold a prospecting right, 
mining right or a combination of both is therefore dependent on the result of the 80% analysis as 
well as the application of any applicable double tax agreement.  
9.1 Recommendation for further studies 
The analysis in this research report left a couple of unanswered question which could be 
explored in more detail in order to obtain further clarity regarding the interpretation and 
application of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. One such question is the intention 
of the legislature when paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act was inserted. It might be 
worthwhile to explore the nature of the mischief the legislature intended to catch by the 
insertion of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. Of particular interest is whether the 
legislature in fact considered the nature and the disposal of prospecting rights and mining rights 
when this paragraph was inserted. Could it be that paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
was inserted without the disposal of a prospecting right and a mining right in mind and that a 
view was subsequently provided in the SARS CGT Guide which led to both these rights being 
regarded as immovable property, thereby resulting in the direct or indirect disposal of both these 
rights falling within the ambit of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act? Based on the 
short length of the section in the SARS CGT Guide addressing this issue, it would further be 
52 
 
worthwhile to ascertain the extent of the research done before this view was put forward in the 
SARS CGT Guide.  
In addition to the above, another question, not specifically mentioned in this research report, 
which could be explored is the exact nature of what a mining right entitles the holder thereof to. 
In general, a mining right entitles the holder thereof with the right to mine and to extract 
minerals from the mining area. The question which could be explored is whether there is an 
argument which could be put forward that a mining right only entitles the holder to the minerals, 
which is movable, and not the land in which it is found. Although the SARS CGT Guide 
classifies a mining right as immovable based on the definition provided in LAWSA (supra) as 
well as the characteristics which a mining right shares with immovable property
100
, it could be 
explored whether sufficient reasons exist that, although minerals are immovable due to the land 
in which they are situated, the minerals can only be processed and sold once it is severed from 
the earth. As long as the minerals are situated in the earth, it cannot be applied or sold in the 
necessary form to achieve the desired objective of mining. The question therefore arises whether 
it should not be regarded that a mining right in actual fact only entitles the holder thereof to the 
mineral once it is severed from the earth, which would then be regarded as a movable asset.  
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